A simple model that is commonly used to interpret movements in corporate common stock. price indexes asserts that real stock prices equal the present value of rationally expected or optimally forecasted future real dividends discounted by a constant real discount rate. This valuation model (or variations on it in which the real discount rate is not constant but fairly stable) is often used by economists and market analysts alike as a plausible model to describe the behavior of aggregate market indexes and is viewed as providing a reasonable story to tell when people ask what accounts for a sudden movement in stock price indexes. Such movements are then attributed to "new information" about future dividends. I will refer to this model as the "efficient markets model" although it should be recognized that this name has also been applied to other models.
A simple model that is commonly used to interpret movements in corporate common stock. price indexes asserts that real stock prices equal the present value of rationally expected or optimally forecasted future real dividends discounted by a constant real discount rate. This valuation model (or variations on it in which the real discount rate is not constant but fairly stable) is often used by economists and market analysts alike as a plausible model to describe the behavior of aggregate market indexes and is viewed as providing a reasonable story to tell when people ask what accounts for a sudden movement in stock price indexes. Such movements are then attributed to "new information" about future dividends. I will refer to this model as the "efficient markets model" although it should be recognized that this name has also been applied to other models.
It has often been claimed in popular discussions that stock price indexes seem too "volatile," that is, that the movements in stock price indexes could not realistically be attributed to any objective new information, since movements in the price indexes seem to be "too big" relative to actual subsequent events. Recently, the notion that financial asset prices are too volatile to accord with efficient markets has received some econometric support in papers by Stephen LeRoy and Richard Porter on the stock market, and by myself on the bond market.
To illustrate graphically why it seems that stock prices are too volatile, I have plotted in Figure 1 a stock price index p, with its ex post rational counterpart p* (data set 1). ' The stock price index pt is the real Standard and Poor's Composite Stock Price Index (detrended by dividing by a factor proportional to the long-run exponential growth path) and p* is the present discounted value of the actual subsequent real dividends (also as a proportion of the same long-run growth factor).2 The analogous series for a modified Dow Jones Industrial Average appear in Figure 2 (data set 2). One is struck by the smoothness and stability of the ex post rational price series p* when compared with the actual price series. This behavior of p* is due to the fact that the present value relation relates p* to a long-weighted moving average of dividends (with weights corresponding to discount factors) and moving averages tend to smooth the series averaged. Moreover, while real dividends did vary over this sample period, they did not vary long enough or far enough to cause major movements in p*. For example, while one normally thinks of the Great Depression as a time when business was bad, real dividends were substantially below their long -run exponential growth path (i.e., 10-25 percent below the growth path for the Standard and Poor's series, 16-38 percent below the growth path for the Dow Series) only for a few depression years : 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1938 . The moving average which determines p* will smooth out such short-run fluctuations. Clearly the stock market decline beginning in 1929 and ending in 1932 could not be rationalized in terms of subsequent dividends! Nor could it be rationalized in terms of subsequent earnings, since earnings are relevant in this model only as indicators of later dividends. Of course, the efficient markets model does not say p=p*. Might one still suppose that this kind of stock market crash was a rational mistake, a forecast error that rational people might make? This paper will explore here the notion that the very volatility of p (i.e., the tendency of big movements in p to occur again and again) implies that the answer is no.
To give an idea of the kind of volatility comparisons that will be made here, let us consider at this point the simplest inequality which puts limits on one measure of volatility: the standard deviation of p. The efficient markets model can be described as asserting that p, =E,( p*), i.e., p, is the mathematical expectation conditional on all information available at time t of p*. In other words, p, is the optimal forecast of p*. One can define the forecast error as u,= p* -pt. A fundamental principle of optimal forecasts is that the forecast error u, must be uncorrelated with the forecast; that is, the covariance between p, and u, must be zero. If a forecast error showed a consistent correlation with the forecast itself, then that would in itself imply that the forecast could be improved. Mathematically, it can be shown from the theory of conditional expectations that u, must be uncorrelated with p,.
If This paper will develop the efficient markets model in Section I to clarify some theoretical questions that may arise in connection with the inequality (1) and some similar inequalities will be derived that put limits on the standard deviation of the innovation in price and the standard deviation of the change in price. The model is restated in innovation form which allows better understanding of the limits on stock price volatility imposed by the model. In particular, this will enable us to see (Section II) that the standard deviation of tvp is highest when information about dividends is revealed smoothly and that if information is revealed in big lumps occasionally the price series may have higher kurtosis (fatter tails) but will have lower variance. The notion expressed by some that earnings rather than dividend data should be used is discussed in Section III, and a way of assessing the importance of time variation in real discount rates is shown in Section IV. The inequalities are compared with the data in Section V. This paper takes as its starting point the approach I used earlier (1979) which showed evidence suggesting that long-term bond yields are too volatile to accord with simple expectations models of the term structure of interest rates.4 In that paper, it was shown how restrictions implied by efficient markets on the cross-covariance function of shortterm and long-term interest rates imply inequality restrictions on the spectra of the long-term interest rate series which characterize the smoothness that the long rate should display. In this paper, analogous implications are derived for the volatility of stock prices, although here a simpler and more intuitively appealing discussion of the model in terms of its innovation representation is used. This paper also has benefited from the earlier discussion by LeRoy and Porter which independently derived some restrictions on security price volatility implied by the efficient markets model and concluded that common stock prices are too volatile to accord with the model. They applied a methodology in some ways similar to that used here to study a stock price index and individual stocks in a sample period starting after World War II.
It is somewhat inaccurate to say that this paper attempts to contradict the extensive literature of efficient markets (as, for example, Paul Cootner's volume on the random character of stock prices, or Eugene Fama's survey).5 Most of this literature really examines different properties of security prices. Very little of the efficient markets literature bears directly on the characteristic feature of the model considered here: that expected real returns for the aggregate stock market are constant through time (or approximately so). Much of the literature on efficient markets concerns the investigation of nominal "profit opportunities" (variously defined) and whether transactions costs prohibit their exploitation. Of course, if real stock prices are "too volatile" as it is defined here, then there may well be a sort of real profit opportunity. Time variation in expected real interest rates does not itself imply that any 3Some people will object to this derivation of (I) and say that one might as well have said that E,(p,) =p,* i.e., that forecasts are correct "on average," which would lead to a reversal of the inequality (1). This objection stems, however, from a misinterpretation of conditional expectations. The subscript t on the expectations operator E means "taking as given (i.e., nonrandom) all variables known at time t." Clearly, pt is known at time t and p* is not. In practical terms, if a forecaster gives as his forecast anything other than Et( p*), then high forecast is not optimal in the sense of expected squared forecast error. If he gives a forecast which equals E( p,*) only on average, then he is adding random noise to the optimal forecast. The amount of noise apparent in Figures We may also write the model as noted above in terms of the ex post rational price series p1* (analogous to the ex post rational interest rate series that Jeremy Siegel and I used to study the Fisher effect, or that I used to study the expectations theory of the term structure). That is, p1* is the present value of actual subsequent dividends: There is yet another way to write the model, which will be useful in the analysis which follows. For this purpose, it is convenient to adopt notation for the innovation in a variable. Let us define the innovation operator t -Et -Et-1 where Et is the conditional expectations operator. are not directly observable, that is, we do not know when the public gets information about a particular dividend. Thus, in deriving inequalities below, one is obliged to assume the "worst possible" pattern of information accrual. Expressions (2)-(5) constitute four different representations of the same efficient markets model. Expressions (4) and (5) are particularly useful for deriving our inequalities on measures of volatility. We have already used (4) to derive the limit (1) on the standard deviation of p given the standard deviation of p*, and we will use (5) to derive a limit on the standard deviation of Sp given the standard deviation of d.
One issue that relates to the derivation of (1) can now be clarified. The inequality (1) was derived using the assumption that the forecast error ut =P* -Pt is uncorrelated with Pt. However, the forecast error ut is not serially uncorrelated. It is uncorrelated with all information known at time t, but the lagged forecast error ut_1 is not known at time t since P'*I is not discovered at time t. In fact, ut= lz3k= +kpt+k as can be seen by substituting the expressions for pt and pt' from (3) and (4) into ut =p* -Pt, and rearranging. Since the series 8tp, is serially uncorrelated, ut has first-order autoregressive serial correlation.8 For this reason, it is inappropriate to test the model by regressing Pt* -pt on variables known at time t and using the ordinary t-statistics of the coefficients of these variables. However, a generalized least squares transformation of the variables would yield an appropriate regression test. We might thus regress the transformed variable ut -Yu+ I on variables known at time t. Since ut -yuti y , this amounts to testing whether the innovation in price can be forecasted. I will perform and discuss such regression tests in Section V below. To find a limit on the standard deviation of Sp for a given standard deviation of dt, first note that d, equals its unconditional expectation plus the sum of its innovations: The variance of the innovation in price is thus maximized when information about dividends is revealed in a smooth fashion so that the standard deviation of the new information at time t about a future dividend d,+k is proportional to its weight in the present value formula in the model (5). In contrast, suppose all dividends somehow became known years before they were paid. Then the innovations in dividends would be so heavily discounted in (5) that they would contribute little to the standard deviation of the innovation in price. Alternatively, suppose nothing were known about dividends until the year they are paid. Here, although the innovation would not be heavily discounted in (5), the impact of the innovation would be confined to only one term in (5), and the standard deviation in the innovation in price would be limited to the standard deviation in the single dividend.
Other inequalities analogous to (11) can also be derived in the same way. For exam90f course, all indeterministic stationary processes can be given linear moving average representations, as Hermann Wold showed. However, it does not follow that the process can be given a moving average representation in terms of its own innovations. The true process may be generated nonlinearly or other information besides its own lagged values may be used in forecasting. These will generally result in a less than perfect correlation of the terms in (5). value. This phenomenon is commonly attributed to a tendency for new information to come in big lumps infrequently. There seems to be a common presumption that this information lumping might cause stock price changes to have high or infinite variance, which would seem to contradict the conclusion in the preceding section that the variance of price is limited and is maximized if forecasts have a simple autoregressive structure.
High sample kurtosis does not indicate infinite variance if we do not assume, as did Fama (1965) and others, that price changes are drawn from the stable Paretian class of distributions.'0 The model does not suggest that price changes have a distribution in this class. The model instead suggests that the existence of moments for the price series is implied by the existence of moments for the dividends series.
As long as d is jointly stationary with information and has a finite variance, then p, p*, Sp, and Ap will be stationary and have a finite variance." If d is normally distributed, however, it does not follow that the price variables will be normally distributed. In fact, they may yet show high kurtosis.
To see this possibility, suppose the dividends are serially independent and identically normally distributed. The kurtosis of the price series is defined by K= E( )4/ (E(fp)2)2, where p_p-E(p).
Suppose, as an example, that with a probability of 1/n '0The empirical fact about the unconditional distribution of stock price changes in not that they have infinite variance (which can never be demonstrated with any finite sample), but that they have high kurtosis in the sample.
1 "With any stationary process X, the existence of a finite var(X,) implies, by Schwartz's inequality, a finite value of cov(X,, X?+k) for any k, and hence the entire autocovariance function of X, and the spectrum, exists. Moreover, the variance of E,(X,) must also be finite, since the variance of X equals the variance of E,(X,) plus the variance of the forecast error. There is no reason why price per share ought to be the present value of expected earnings per share if some earnings are retained. In fact, as Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani argued, such a present value formula would entail a fundamental sort of double counting. It is incorrect to include in the present value formula both earnings at time t and the later earnings that accrue when time t earnings are reinvested.14 Miller and Modigliani showed a formula by which price might be regarded as the present value of earnings corrected for investments, but that formula can be shown, using an accounting identity to be identical to (2).
Some people seem to feel that one cannot claim price as present value of expected dividends since firms routinely pay out only a fraction of earnings and also attempt somewhat to stabilize dividends. They are right in the case where firms paid out no dividends, for then the price p1 would have to grow at the discount rate r, and the model (2) would not be the solution to the difference equation implied by the condition E,(H,)=r. On the other hand, if firms pay out a fraction of dividends or smooth shortrun fluctuations in dividends, then the price of the firm will grow at a rate less than the 12For simplicity, in this example, the assumption elsewhere in this article that d, is always known at time t has been dropped. It follows that in this example 8,p, #-Apt +dt , -rp, 1 but instead 8,p, =pt.
13 For another illustrative example, consider d, jd,1 + E, as with the upper bound for the inequality (11) but where the dividends are announced for the next n years every l/n years. Here, even though d, has the autoregressive structure, E, is not the innovation in d,. As n goes to infinity, a(8p) approaches zero. 14LeRoy and Porter do assume price as present value of earnings but employ a correction to the price and earnings series which is, under additional theoretical assumptions not employed by Miller and Modigliani, a correction for the double counting. discount rate and (2) is the solution to the difference equation."5 With our Standard and Poor data, the growth rate of real price is only about 1.5 percent, while the discount rate is about 4.8%+1.5%=6.3%. At these rates, the value of the firm a few decades hence is so heavily discounted relative to its size that it contributes very little to the value of the stock today; by far the most of the value comes from the intervening dividends. Hence (2) and the implied p* ought to be useful characterizations of the value of the firm.
The crucial thing to recognize in this context is that once we know the terminal price and intervening dividends, we have specified all that investors care about. It would not make sense to define an ex post rational price from a terminal condition on price, using the same formula with earnings in place of dividends.
IV. Time-Varying Real Discount Rates
If we modify the model (2) to allow real discount rates to vary without restriction through time, then the model becomes untestable. We do not observe real discount rates directly. Regardless of the behavior of P1 and D1, there will always be a discount rate series which makes (2) hold identically. We might ask, though, whether the movements in the real discount rate that would be required aren't larger than we might have expected. Or is it possible that small movements in the current one-period discount rate coupled with new information about such movements in future discount rates could account for high stock price volatility?16
The natural extension of (2) to the case of time varying real discount rates is (14) Pt =Et (Dt+ll lk+r,,) which has the property that E,((1 +H1)/ (1 + r)) -1. If we set 1 + r = (aU/aCt)/ (aU/aC+ l), i.e., to the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption where U is the additively separable utility of consumption, then this property is the first-order condition for a maximum of expected utility subject to a stock market budget constraint, and equation (14) where y=1/(1+E(rF)), and a hat over a variable denotes the variable minus its mean. The first term in the above expression is just the expression for p* in (4) (demeaned). The second term represents the effect on p* of 15To understand this point, it helps to consider a traditional continuous time growth model, so instead of (2) we have PO =1?D,e -r'dt. In such a model, a firm has a constant earnings stream I. If it pays out all earnings, then D= I and PO = fj' Ie -rfdt= I/r. If it pays out only s of its earnings, then the firm grows at rate (I -s)r, Dt s=e(' -s)rt which is less than I at t=O, but higher than I later on. Then Po= 0fosIe(' s)rte-rdtfO'sle -srtdt=sI/(rs). If s#O (so that we're not dividing by zero) PO = J/r. '6James Pesando has discussed the analogous question: how large must the variance in liquidity premia be in order to justify the volatility of long-term interest rates? movements in real discount rates. This second term is identical to the expression for p* in (4) except that dt+k is replaced by rt+k and the expression is premultiplied by -E(d)/E(r)-It is possible to offer a simple intuitive interpretation for this linearization. First note that the derivative of 1(1 + rt+k), with respect to r evaluated at E(r) is -y Thus, a one percentage point increase in -t+k causes 17 (1 +r,+k) to drop by y2 times 1 percent, or slightly less than 1 percent. Note that all terms in (15) dated t+k or higher are premultiplied by 17 (1 +'+k) .
Thus, if rt+k is increased by one percentage point, all else constant, then all of these terms will be reduced by about y2 times 1 percent. We can approximate the sum of all these terms as
where E(d )/E(F) is the value at the beginning of time t + k of a constant dividend stream E(d) discounted by E(F), and yk-1 discounts it to the present. So, we see that a one percentage point increase in -t+k, all else constant, decreases p' by about yk+ 'E(d)/E(rF), which corresponds to the kth term in expression (16). There are two sources of inaccuracy with this linearization. First, the present value of all future dividends starting with time t+k is not exactly yk-'E(d )/E(rF). Second, increasing ?k by one percentage point does not cause 1/(1 +rt+k) to fall by exactly y2 times 1 percent. To some extent, however, these errors in the effects on p* of i-, r-+ 't+2' should average out, and one can use (16) to get an idea of the effects of changes in discount rates.
To give an impression as to the accuracy of the linearization (16), I computed p* for data set 2 in two ways: first using (15) and then using (16), with the same terminal condition p1*979I In place of the unobserved lr series, I used the actual four-six-month prime commercial paper rate plus a constant to give it the mean r of Table 2 . The commercial paper rate is a nominal interest rate, and thus one would expect its fluctuations represent changes in inflationary expectations as well as real interest rate movements. I chose it nonetheless, rather arbitrarily, as a series which shows much more fluctuation than one would normally expect to see in an is the lower bound on a computed as a one-sided x2 95 percent confidence interval. The symbols p, d, r, F2, b, and p* are defined in the text. Data sets are described in the Appendix. Inequality (1) in the text asserts that the standard deviation in row 5 should be less than or equal to that in row 6, inequality (11) that a in row 7 should be less than or equal to that in row 8, and inequality (13) that a in row 9 should be less than that in row 10.
expected real rate. The commercial paper rate ranges, in this sample, from 0.53 to 9.87 percent. It stayed below 1 percent for over a decade (1935-46) and, at the end of the sample, stayed generally well above 5 percent for over a decade. In spite of this erratic behavior, the correlation coefficient between p* computed from (15) and p* computed from (16) was .996, and a(p *) was 250.5 and 268.0 by (15) and (16), respectively. Thus the linearization (16) can be quite accurate. Note also that while these large movements in icause p* to move much more than was observed in Figure 2 , a( p*) is still less than half of a( p). This suggests that the variability i-that is needed to save the efficient markets model is much larger yet, as we shall see.
To put a formal lower bound on a(r) given the variability of Ap, note that (16) This inequality puts a lower bound on a(r) proportional to the discrepancy between the left-hand side and right-hand side of the inequality (13).'7 It will be used to examine the data in the next section.
V. Empirical Evidence
The elements of the inequalities (1), (11), and (13) are displayed for the two data sets (described in the Appendix) in Table 2 . In both data sets, the long-run exponential growth path was estimated by regressing ln(P1) on a constant and time. Then A in (3) was set equal to eb where b is the coefficient of time (Table 2 ). The discount rate r used to compute p* from (4) With data set 2, the nominal series are a modified Dow Jones Industrial Average and associated dividend series. With this data set, the advantages and disadvantages of data set 1 are reversed. My modifications in the Dow Jones Industrial Average assure that this series reflects the performance of a single unchanging portfolio. The disadvantage is that the performance of only 30 stocks is recorded. Table 2 reveals that all inequalities are dramatically violated by the sample statistics for both data sets. The left-hand side of the inequality is always at least five times as great as the right-hand side, and as much as thirteen times as great.
The violation of the inequalities implies that "innovations" in price as we measure them can be forecasted. In fact, if we regress t+ IPt+l onto (a constant and) pt, we get significant results: a coefficient of pt of -.1521 (t= -3.218, R2 =.0890) for data set 1 and a coefficient of -.2421 (t= -2.631, R2=.1238) for data set 2. These results are '7In deriving the inequality (13) it was assumed that d, was known at time t, so by analogy this inequality would be based on the assumption that r, is known at time t. However, without this assumption the same inequality could be derived anyway. The maximum contribution of it to the variance of A P occurs when Ft is known at time t.
18JThis is not equivalent to the average dividend price ratio, which was slightly higher (.0514 for data set 1, .0484 for data set 2). not due to the representation of the data as a proportion of the long-run growth path. In fact, if the holding period return H, is regressed on a constant and the dividend price ratio D, /P,, we get results that are only slightly less significant: a coefficient of 3.533 (t=2.672, R2 =.0631) for data set 1 and a coefficient of 4.491 (t= 1.795, R2 = .0617) for data set 2.
These regression tests, while technically valid, may not be as generally useful for appraising the validity of the model as are the simple volatility comparisons. First, as noted above, the regression tests are not insensitive to data misalignment. Such low R2 might be the result of dividend or commodity price index data errors. Second, although the model is rejected in these very long samples, the tests may not be powerful if we confined ourselves to shorter samples, for which the data are more accurate, as do most researchers in finance, while volatility comparisons may be much more revealing. To see this, consider a stylized world in which (for the sake of argument) the dividend series d, is absolutely constant while the price series behaves as in our data set. Since the actual dividend series is fairly smooth, our stylized world is not too remote from our own. If dividends d, are absolutely constant, however, it should be obvious to the most casual and unsophisticated observer by volatility arguments like those made here that the efficient markets model must be wrong. Price movements cannot reflect new information about dividends if dividends never change. Yet regressions like those run above will have limited power to reject the model. If the alternative hypothesis is, say, that p pfl11 +E , where p is close to but less than one, then the power of the test in short samples will be very low. In this stylized world we are testing for the stationarity of the p, series, for which, as we know, power is low in short samples.'9 For example, if postwar data from, say, 1950-65 were chosen (a period often used in recent financial markets studies) when the stock market was drifting up, then clearly the regression tests will not reject. Even in periods showing a reversal of upward drift the rejection may not be significant.
Using inequality (17), we can compute how big the standard deviation of real discount rates would have to he to possibly account for the discrepancy a(/?p)-a(d)/(2r)'/2 between Table 2 results (rows 9 and 10) and the inequality (13). Assuming Table 2 Table 2 , then the real interest rate r, would have to range from -3.91 to 13.52 percent for data set 1 and -8.16 to 17.27 percent for data set 2! And these ranges reflect lowest possible standard deviations which are consistent with the model only if the real rate has the firstorder autoregressive structure and perfect negative correlation with dividends! These estimated standard deviations of ex ante real interest rates are roughly consistent with the results of the simple regressions noted above. In a regression of H, on D,/P, and a constant, the standard deviation of the fitted value of H, is 4.42 and 5.71 percent for data sets 1 and 2, respectively. These large standard deviations are consistent with the low R2 because the standard deviation of H, is so much higher (17.60 and 23.00 percent, respectively). The regressions of 51p, on p, suggest higher standard deviations of expected real interest rates. The standard deviation of the fitted value divided by the average detrended price is 5.24 and 8.67 percent for data sets 1 and 2, respectively.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
We have seen that measures of stock price volatility over the past century appear to be far too high-five to thirteen times too '9If dividends are constant (let us say dt =0) then a test of the model by a regression of 8,+ pt+I on pt amounts to a regression of pt+ on pt with the null hypothesis that the coefficient of pt is (1 + r). This appears to be an explosive model for which t-statistics are not valid yet our true model, which in effect assumes a(d)#=O, is nonexplosive. high-to be attributed to new information about future real dividends if uncertainty about future dividends is measured by the sample standard deviations of real dividends around their long-run exponential growth path. The lower bound of a 95 percent onesided x2 confidence interval for the standard deviation of annual changes in real stock prices is over five times higher than the upper bound allowed by our measure of the observed variability of real dividends. The failure of the efficient markets model is thus so dramatic that it would seem impossible to attribute the failure to such things as data errors, price index problems, or changes in tax laws.
One way of saving the general notion of efficient markets would be to attribute the movements in stock prices to changes in expected real interest rates. Since expected real interest rates are not directly observed, such a theory can not be evaluated statistically unless some other indicator of real rates is found. I have shown, however, that the movements in expected real interest rates that would justify the variability in stock prices are very large-much larger than the movements in nominal interest rates over the sample period.
Another way of saving the general notion of efficient markets is to say that our measure of the uncertainty regarding future dividends-the sample standard deviation of the movements of real dividends around their long-run exponential growth path -understates the true uncertainty about future dividends. Perhaps the market was rightfully fearful of much larger movements than actually materialized. One is led to doubt this, if after a century of observations nothing happened which could remotely justify the stock price movements. The movements in real dividends the market feared must have been many times larger than those observed in the Great Depression of the 1930's, as was noted above. Since the market did not know in advance with certainty the growth path and distribution of dividends that was ultimately observed, however, one cannot be sure that they were wrong to consider possible major events which did not occur. Such an explanation of the volatility of stock prices, however, is "academic," in that it relies fundamentally on unobservables and cannot be evaluated statistically. To produce the series used in this paper, the Capital Changes Reporter was used to trace changes in the companies from 1928 to 1979. Of the original 30 companies of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, at the end of our sample (1979), 9 had the identical names, 12 had changed only their names, and 9 had been acquired, merged or consolidated. For these latter 9, the price and dividend series are continued as the price and dividend of the shares exchanged by the acquiring corporation. In only one case was a cash payment, along with shares of the acquiring corporation, exchanged for the shares of the acquired corporation. In this case, the price and dividend series were continued as the price and dividend of the shares exchanged by the acquiring corporation. In four cases, preferred shares of the acquiring corporation were among shares exchanged. Common shares of equal value were substituted for these in our series. The number of shares of each firm included in the total is determined by the splits, and effective splits effected by stock dividends and merger. The price series is the value of all these shares on the last trading day of the preceding year, as shown on the Wharton School's Rodney White Center Common Stock tape. The dividend series is the total for the year of dividends and the cash value of other distributions for all these shares. The price and dividend series were deflated using the same wholesale price indexes as in data set 1.
